Did nothing until the research was made public.
Simone Margaritelli / Evilsocket followed the TP-Link process to disclose things responsibly.
Here is the timeline
July 22, 2025: Sent initial report to TP-Link’s security team (security@tp-link.com) with full technical details, PoC exploits and videos. All compiled according to their guidelines.
July 22, 2025: Acknowledgment received.
August 22, 2025: TP-Link confirms they’re still reviewing the report
September 27, 2025: TP-Link responds and sets the timeline for the remediation patch to the end of November 2025.
November 2025: Nothing happens.
December 1, 2025: Sent follow up email, no response.
December 4, 2025: Sent another follow up email, which TP-Link responds to, further postponing the patch to the following week. The following week: Nothing happens.
December 19, 2025: Public disclosure after 150 days.
December 20, 2025: TP-Link finally publishes a security advisory for CVE-2025-8065, CVE-2025-14299 and CVE-2025-14300.
Research write-up: TP-Link Tapo C200: Hardcoded Keys, Buffer Overflows and Privacy in the Era of AI Assisted Reverse Engineering | evilsocket
I have talked to a lot of people in security who agree that TP-Link becoming a CNA was not so they could better process their vulnerabilities, but so they could control the process in a way that favors them.
Patrick Garrity ![]()
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is quite the expert on this topic has talked about TP-Link before #cybersecurity #infosecurity #riskmanagement #vulnerabilitymanagement | Patrick Garrity 👾🛹💙